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CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS AND THE ENGLISH 






This piece is a short discussion on the English; and more widely the 
common law concept of the trust and its traditional exclusion from civil law 
systems.  It seeks to unearth that the apparent distaste civil law systems have 
for the common law trust is rooted in each system’s respective attitude to 
rights in property and at least some degree of mistranslation.  This apparent 
gulf in understanding can be bridged by incorporating the trust into the more 
ancient Roman law concept of the patrimony, thereby making the trust sit 
more comfortably in civil law jurisdictions.  In bridging the divide, this new 
appreciation for the trust challenges us as common lawyers to reconsider the 
traditional common law premise of the trust as being less about proprietary 




The legal historian and renowned comparative jurist Frederic Maitland, (b 
1850-d 1906) keenly espoused the trust as England’s greatest export to the 
body of legal theory: 
 
“If we were asked what is the greatest and most distinctive 
achievement performed by Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence I 
cannot think we should have any better answer to give than this, 
namely the development from century to century of the trust idea.”1
 
There can be little doubt the trust has proved an incredibly versatile 
instrument spreading throughout the common law world from a means to 
protect family estates and assets into banking, commerce, charities and even 
∗ LLB (Hons) (Exon), BVC student at BPP Law School, London. Student member 
of Lincoln's Inn. Hardwicke and Sir Thomas More Scholar and member of the 
Denning Society, Lincoln’s Inn. 
1 F W Maitland Selected Essays Hazeltine, Lapsley and Winfield (eds) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1936) p 129. 
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public and administrative law.2  The focus of this piece turns on Maitland’s 
characterisation of the trust as an English concept; particularly how valuable 
such a characterisation is and how readily the trust can been embraced by civil 
law systems, which do not share in England’s common law heritage.  If the 
trust is so extraordinary, why has its development been so limited among 
civilian jurisdictions?3  
 
THE TRUST IN THE CIVIL AND COMMON LAW TRADITION 
 
There is no universally agreed definition of a trust only a number of 
distinctive characteristics such as the splitting of property into legal and 
equitable or beneficial ownership, and the duty of the trustee to hold and 
manage the property in accordance with the rules established in a trust for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries.4  
Maitland attributes the development of the ‘trust idea’ to the ingenuity of 
Englishmen and their development of the Common Law.5  This fixation with 
the Englishness of the trust, while patriotic, has inhibited its exploration and 
adoption among civil jurists.  Those factors which in England and other 
common law countries, we associate to be a vital to the understanding of the 
trust, for example its presupposed connection with the law of property and 
equity,6 can perhaps act as a barrier to better conceptual understanding.  
While the trust traces its origins to the ‘use’ in the Medieval Court of 
Chancery, we may be better able to understand the essence of the trust 
concept by divorcing it from its historical context that has perhaps 
conditioned our perceptions of what a trust must be.  Cloaking the trust in its 
English historical context hinders our understanding of it in terms of rights, 
relationships and duties.  In short, this piece focuses less about what the trust 
concept is, but how the trust concept can be better understood. 
Maitland’s enthusiasm fails to appreciate that the trust is hampered in its 
development by the premise that it is a product of the common law tradition, 
the law/equity duality which is otherwise mysterious to civilian legal 
2 P Lepaulle “Si l’on demande à Quoi Sert le Trust, on Peut Presque Répondre: ‘à 
Tout’.”  [‘What is the Trust Used For?  Almost Everything’] Traité Théorique et 
Pratique des Trusts in Droit Interne, en Droit Fiscal et en Droit International (Paris: 
Rousseau et Cie, 1932) p 12.  
3 P Lepaulle “Trusts and the Civil Law” (1933) 15 1 Journal of Comparative 
Legislation and International Law 18. 
4 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 48 (2007 Reissue) Trusts. 
5 F H Lawson A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law University of Michigan Law 
School Lectures (1953) 201, and B Rudden “Things as Things and Things as Wealth” 
(1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 806. 
6 G L Gretton “Trusts without Equity” (2000) 49(3) The International Comparative 
Law Quarterly 599.  
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systems.7 The trust does not have to be conceptualised within the framework 
of English law: “The orthodox explanation, given in terms of the tradition 
distinction between law and equity, provides only a historical and not a 
rational account of the trust.”8  In précis, the law of trusts, as understood by 
common lawyers, is an offshoot of the law of property, whereby ownership is 
divided.9  This (traditionally English) analysis founders in legal systems that 
do not recognise split ownership of property.  A major semantic gulf opens up 
when we talk about trusts as part of the law of property, which cascades into 
problems with the identification, status and function of the trustee and the 
tripartite relationship between the trustee, the settlor and the beneficiary 
which are worthy of better explication for sake of clarity, both for ourselves 
and civil jurisdictions.  The French jurist Pierre Lepaulle states, “[. . .] it is 
impossible to translate the rights of the trustee into those of an ‘owner’ in our 
[ie French or more widely civilian] conception of property.  He has neither 
usus nor fructus nor abusus.”10
The civil law methodology is to regard the ownership of property as 
carrying both inseparable rights and obligations. (See the discussion of the 
patrimony below) Civilians regard the separation of benefit and liability in 
property (seen in the English trust by the division between legal and equitable 
title) as difficult, even ideologically objectionable.11  Apparent is the deeply 
held intellectual difference between English and civilian property ownership.  
The English approach to property has historically been as a means to greater 
personal freedom for the individual, while the civilian approach sees property 
ownership as carrying innate and inalienable responsibilities towards the 
community at large.12  This is most patent with regard to French and German 
7 G L Gretton, ibid, at 600 “The…reason why trust have proved so problematic for the 
comparatist is that there is a widespread belief that they are a special product of the 
common law tradition and, in particular, or its law/equity duality, and thus 
intrinsically mysterious to the civilian tradition.” 
8 B Rudden, above n 5, at 89. 
9 Abdul Hameed Sitti Kadija v De Saram [1946] 208 (Ceylon) at 217 PC “…the 
distinction between the legal and equitable estate is the essence of the trust.” 
10 “Il est…impossible de traduire les droits du trustee comme étant ceux d’un 
‘propriétaire’ dans notre conception de la propriété. Le trustee n’a ni l’usus…ni le 
fructus ni l’abusus.” P Lapaulle, Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé Vol 7 (1955) 
318, at 319.  Usus, fructus and abusus were in the ius commune taken as the essence 
of ownership. 
11 F H Lawson, above n 5, at 201 “Perhaps the greatest difficulty the civilians have in 
accepting the trust is caused by what I have come to regard as an English peculiarity 
logically detachable from the trust, the distinction between legal and equitable 
estates.” 
12 V Bolgar “Why no Trusts in Civil Law?” (1953) 2 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 204 at 210: “The…basic obstacle to acceptance of the trust [in legal 
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notions of corporate social responsibility, placing a strong emphasis on the 
company as a social rather than purely economic enterprise.13  However, it is 
conceded that this contrast (particularly with respect to corporate social 
responsibility) may diminish with the advent of the new codified director’s 
duty provisions in Companies Act 2006.14
By comparison, the English trust allows separation of the responsibility of 
property ownership (liability) from its enjoyment.  The origins of the trust 
have long been disputed but separation has proved a useful means to 
circumvent historical traps to greater personal liberty through the ownership 
of property, the principle modern example being taxation on capital gains, 
property and inheritance.15
Moving on to divorce the trust from its socioeconomic context we 
discover that the fundamentals of the trust mechanism have very little to do 
with the world of property but are in fact a very sophisticated arrangement of 
personal rights and duties between various parties; the settler/testator, the 
trustee, the beneficiary and any outside third party.  Respective analysis of the 
trust in terms of personal rights rather than property rights is the great 
misunderstanding between civilians and common lawyers.  A hangover from 
the trust’s proprietary (English) trappings is the description attached to 
respective rights as either ‘rights in rem’ (property rights) or ‘rights in 
personam’ (personal rights).  There is no direct translation between the 
common law ‘rem’ and civilian ‘real rights’,16 neither is there a correlative 
division between proprietary and personal remedies so in comparing the two 
systems simple mistranslation has been a serious obstacle to wider adoption of 
the trust concept.  
Rights against the trustee can be both proprietary and personal, an action 
for damages for breach of trust being the obvious example.  It will be a very 
unusual circumstance for a trustee to have divested himself of trust property 
and remain a trustee.  Such a scenario would be, where the trustee has allowed 
trust property to diminish to nil value or has passed it to an ‘equities darling’ 
for a insignificant value to which the beneficial interest then attaches.  (In 
either case, it is still arguable that the trustee is vested with trust property, just 
not valuable property). 
 
systems with a civilian property law] is the concept of autonomous and indivisible 
ownership.” 
13 M Yavisi “Shareholding and Board Structures of German and UK Companies” 
(2001) 22 2 Company Lawyer. 
14 “Duty to promote the success of the company”’ Companies Act 2006, s 172.  Note 
the expanded list of the key ‘stakeholder’ groups. 
15 Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291, Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) [1974] Ch 100, 
see also J Langbein “The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts” (1995) 105 Yale 
Law Journal 625 for a discussion as to the origin of the trust. 
16 Webb v Webb [1994] 3 All ER 911 (ECJ Case No C-294/92). 
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A trustee then is always personally liable, whether vested with property or 
not and if explaining to a civilian jurist, that in either case, the beneficiary will 
always have a personal action against a trustee, whether he is vested with 
property or not, the distinction between proprietary and personal remedies 
becomes otiose.  
 
THE TRUST AS PATRIMONY 
 
A solution that would perhaps level the semantic differences would be to 
view the trust idea through the concept of the patrimony, looking not to 
property law’s rem/personam taxonomy, but to the general totality of a 
person’s assets and liabilities to better understand the trust.17  The patrimony 
is a remnant from the Roman law patrimonium but was later readopted and 
developed in the 19th Century by civilian jurists.  
The patrimony is a figurative ‘bag’ of freestanding legal relationships 
attaching to an individual having two parts conjoined together; both assets and 
liabilities.  The appropriate visualisation would be of a man carrying a bag of 
shopping, all the assets and liabilities in the bag belong to him.  Now imagine 
the man in addition to carrying his shopping is also carrying the shopping bag 
of someone else in his other hand.  Although he carries the second bag with 
him, its contents are not his entitlement but are freestanding.
The patrimony model is useful to better understand the trust idea because 
it does not equate ‘what I have’ with ‘what I own,’ all my rights are mine but 
not all rights are rights of ownership.  The trust is a special patrimony, where 
assets and liabilities are a separate ‘bag’ of assets and liabilities segregated 
from the trustee’s personal patrimony.  The rights of the beneficiary are 
personal against the trustee and enforceable against the special patrimony.  
This avoids the need to classify the beneficiaries’ rights as real (ie as against 
the trustees’ creditors) as the duality of ownership is actually duality of 
patrimony.  This also goes to explain why the trust will not fail for want of a 
trustee, as his patrimony will survive him if he parts with it.18  
The patrimony model has resonance with the Hohfeldian analysis of rights 
and correlative duties.19  The patrimony is entirely personal, negating the need 
17 “…due to a particular construction of the French Civil Code it has often been 
considered in civil law countries that each person has…only one patrimony.”  M 
Grimaldi and F Barrière, in A Hartkamp (Ed), Towards a European Civil Code 
(Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2nd edn, 1998) at 578. 
18 P Lepaulle, above n 3 at 20 “The res must be composed of rights…so a trust can be 
formed only with rights which can be disconnected from the person, moreover the res 
is in fact disconnected from any person forming neither part of the assets of the 
trustee or the cestui.” 
19 W N Hohfeld “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” 
(1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710. 
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to consider Hohfeld’s second category of jural relationship the privilege/no-
right correlative.  While the second category might ordinarily seem to apply to 
liberties in the context of constitutionally guaranteed freedom from 
interference, the privilege/no-right correlative can also be construed as a right 
in rem, being good against the world at large.  
The English mistaken premise lies in the inability to analyse the trust in a 
way not rooted in our own historical perceptions, treating the trust as an 
exclusively English peculiarity using the quintessentially English tools, of law 
and equity, rights in rem and in personam.20  Using the patrimony, a right in 
rem is ‘proprietary’ only as shorthand to say it is personally enforceable 
against the world of people who may try to interfere with an asset.  It is not 
one right in rem but an aggregate of many rights in personam.21  A right in 
personam (in which equity operates) is a narrower collection of claims, not 
against the whole world but against a more limited class of persons.  Rights in 
rem or personam are essentially respectively larger or smaller bunches of 
personal claim rights, further underlining the idea that a trust idea rooted in 
property or real rights is an artificial hindrance to civilian understanding.  
 
THE TRUST AS A CONTRACT 
 
Viewing the trust as patrimony (essentially personal) and not proprietary 
allows it to fit more easily into civilian understanding, having much greater 
applicability to the law of obligations than property, the law of obligations 
being personal.  This is not a new idea, having already been advanced by 
Honoré22 and Hayton23 but serves to underline the gulf between common law 
and civilian understanding of the trust as semantic only.  This dissection of the 
trust as ‘personal’ has been developed among common law (particularly 
American) jurists into a discussion as to whether the trust is actually a 
specialised form of contract.24  
The notion of the trust as a contract or promise is most patent in the many 
19th Century cases concerning the failed settlement of trust property.  It has 
long been the maxim that equity will not assist a volunteer, so a beneficiary 
must provide consideration or have privity as a party to the covenant to be 
20 T B Smith, International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law Vol 6 Ch 2, para 262.  
“Though the English do not lay exclusive claim to discovering God, they do claim to 
have invented the trust with two natures in one.” 
21 J Langbein above n 15, p 636 ‘Tracking the Common Law Estates.’ 
22 “Obstacles to the Reception of Trust Law? The Examples of South Africa and 
Scotland” in A M Rabello (ed) Aequitas and Equity: Equity in Civil Law and Mixed 
Jurisdictions (Jerusalem, 1997) 792, at 812.  
23 D Hayton Principles of European Trust Law (Aspen Publishers Inc, US, 1999). 
24 J Langbein, above n 15. 
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able to enforce the trust personally or through the trustee.25  As in contract, 
the wronged party may seek redress by way of damages at common law or 
specific performance.  However, the contractual parallels diverge where the 
beneficiary is the issue of marriage consideration.  Here the only remedy will 
be to seek specific performance in equity rather than damages.
The trust’s development as a legal institution and structure, despite its 
trappings in the corpus of English property law, is innately about personal 
relationships between settler, trustee and beneficiary which make it readily 
analysable using Hohfeldian and civilian contractual terminology.26  Even the 
traditional English features of a contractual relationship are easily 
recognisable using a ‘personal’ analysis; for example consensual formation, 
wide independence over the terms and evidencing a common intention or 
consensus between the parties, such analysis is easily translated into the 
establishment and governance of modern trusts.  Even Maitland’s own 
analysis was to regard the trust as a ‘bargain’ rather than as proprietary.27  
The English emphasis in determining trust disputes is to look to the 
intention of the settler to establish the meaning of the arrangement, an 
approach with strong contractual parallels.  If the trust is a bargain, then the 
certainty of the terms on which the bargain is reached becomes key.  Lord 
Bridge firmly held that any agreement found solely upon an inference drawn 
from the way the parties conducted their personal affairs and relationships 
was not worthy of the title: 
 
“The first and fundamental question [. . .] is whether, independently of 
any inference to be drawn from the conduct of the parties in the course 
of sharing the house as their home and managing their joint affairs, 
there has [. . .] been any agreement, arrangement or understanding 
reached between them that the property is to be shared beneficially. 
The finding of an agreement or arrangement to share in this sense can 
only, I think, be based on evidence of express discussions between the 
partners, however imperfectly remembered and however imprecise 
their terms may have been.” 28
 
25 Re Plumptre’s Marriage Settlement [1910] 1 Ch 609. 
26 F H Lawson above n 5, at 200“The tree-cornered relation of settler, trustee and 
[beneficiary]…is easily explained in the modern law in terms of a contract for the 
benefit of a third party.” 
27 F Maitland “Equity, a Course of Lectures” (John Brunyate rev ed 2d ed 1936) at p 
29). “[…]the trust[…]originates in agreement….[M]en ought to fulfil their promises, 
their agreements; and they ought to be compelled to do so…[T]he Chancellor begins 
to enforce a personal right, a jus in personam, not a real right, a jus in rem – he begins 
to enforce a right which in truth is a contractual right, a right created by a promise.” 
28 Lloyds Bank v Rossett [1991] 1 AC 107. 
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 In express provisions both inter vivos and testamentary trusts can easily 
be analysed as elaborate contractual arrangements between settler and trustee 
to hold property for the rights of a third part (the beneficiary).  The duration of 
the trust, maybe spanning several generations makes the drafting of a detailed 
contract inappropriate.  The gaps are filled by terms requiring good faith, 
loyalty and prudence on the part of the trustee in the performance of his 
duties.29  Millet LJ however, while not accepting the trustee’s core obligations 
include the duties of skill and care, prudence and diligence, did identified an 
irreducible core of duties to “[. . .]perform the trusts honestly and in good 
faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries [as being] the minimum necessary to 
give substance to the trust, but in my opinion it is sufficient.”30 
The resulting trust can be treated in a similar way without difficulty as 
resulting trusts are simply ‘founded’ on the basis of an intention (or lack of 
intention) on the part of the settler to fully divest themselves of all the interest 
in the trust property.31  
A contractual analysis of the constructive trust is perhaps more difficult 
because the constructive or ‘implied trust’, as it is sometimes called, has a 
remedial quality that sets it apart conceptually from the resulting and express 
trust.  The arguments between academics about whether the constructive trust 
is a court imposed remedy or the result of an implied (but otherwise hidden) 
intention between the parties are well rehearsed and have not definitively been 
laid to rest.  The accusation that the constructive trust is actually a remedy and 
not a trust proper has a stronger resonance when we consider a number of the 
cohabitation disputes over trusts of land.32  
It is in the cohabitation cases of the later 20th Century especially where we 
see the most apparent tension between the traditional, flexible role of equity to 
do best justice between the parties and the need for certainty and predictability 
which has long been the desired policy of the law of real property.  After what 
might be described as a period of judicial fence sitting as exactly how to deal 
with these cases and the concerted efforts of the late Denning LJ, who, among 
his peers, seemed the most happy to play fast and loose with the ‘remedial’ 
constructive trust to affect an equitable outcome;33 the English approach now 
29 F Easterbrook & D Fischel, “Contract and Fiduciary Duty”, 36 JL & Econ 425-438 
(1993) “[A] fiduciary relation is a contractual one characterised by unusually high 
costs of specification and monitoring.  The duty of the loyalty replaces detailed 
contractual terms[…]” 
30 Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241 at 254. 
31 Standing v Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282 (per Lindley LJ at 289). 
32 For examples of the constructive trust used as a general equitable remedy see 
Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 and Grant v 
Edwards [1986] Ch 638. 
33 Hussey v Palmer [1972] 1 WLR 1286 (per Lord Denning MR at 1289). 
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appears to be to shoehorn the otherwise remedial character of a constructive 
trust into terms of an implied agreement to a trust relationship.34
In arguably the most important recent decision on residential constructive 
trusts,35 both Lady Hale (for the majority) and Lord Neuberger (dissenting) 
make common intention rather than ‘fairness’ the appropriate yardstick to 
ascertain beneficial entitlement.36  However, their respective methodologies 
still differ between the majority’s holistic approach37 and the more austere 
measure of intention evidenced by the parties’ financial contribution.  As a 
matter of practice, while the court’s agreement on intention, as the appropriate 
measure is to be welcomed, the majority’s approach to ascertain intention 
remains unsatisfactory, being nebulous and lacking in certainty. 
That said, an intention or contractual based analysis of the constructive 
trust equips us to make better sense of its place among established categories 
of trust mechanism, laying to rest what would otherwise appear to be the 
constructive trusts status as the fifth column.  
 
OPPOSITION TO THE TRUST AS A CONTRACT 
 
The varied objections to a contractual analysis of the trust38 include 
raising conceptual hurdles in translating a tripartite trust arrangement into 
bilateral privity of contract.  If the trust is contractual, how can it make third 
parties liable to proprietary remedies of tracing and how can a unilateral 
declaration of trust possibly be squeezed into our understanding of a contract? 
At the time of his writings, Austin Scott’s critique of the trust as a contract 
using the trust tripartite structure had weight especially against English privity 
rule.  Scott’s objection has now been neutralised with respect to trust, by 
statutory intervention in the shape of the Contract Rights of Third Parties Act 
1999 although the principle has long been recognised in the United States.39  
34 Lloyds Bank v Rossett [1991] 1 AC 107. 
35 Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432.
36 Ibid, at para 144 (per Lord Neuberger) and paragraph 60 (per Lady Hale)“The 
search is to ascertain the parties’ shared intentions, actual, inferred or imputed, with 
respect to the property in the light of their whole course of conduct in relation to it 
[the jointly owned cohabitant home].” 
37Ibid paragraph 69 (per Lady Hale). Note also at paragraph 70 that the checklist of 
factors the court may consider is non-exhaustive and akin to those in Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973, s 25 providing a backdoor by which amorphous considerations of 
fairness can still linger. 
38 A Scott “The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust” (1971) 17 Colum L Rev 
269. 
39 Lawrence v Fox 20 NY 268 (1859) “The duty of the trustee to pay the 
[beneficiaries], according to the terms of the trust, implies a promise to the latter to do 
so.” 
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Further, Scott mistakenly makes his tracing argument against the contractual 
nature of the trust by presuming that trusts are about property and not personal 
right and obligations, however this has already been dealt with above as not 
being fundamental to our understanding of the trust concept.40  Further still, a 
proprietary (tracing) remedy can be interpreted as simply a means to affect a 
personal action for recovery of trust property from its current holder, simply 
seeking out first who to claim from and not providing an end in itself (its 
restoration).41  
Other contractual parallels can be seen in relation to trustee exemption 
clauses on which Millet LJ supplied valuable guidance.42  As with the law of 
contract there was no rule precluding the exclusion of liability, including 
gross negligence, save that no exclusion can be made for dishonesty.  In a 
later case43 it was argued that, trust clauses should have parity with the law of 
contract and should be construed more stringently against the party who made 
the document.  However, Millett LJ remarked that while in a contractual 
setting this is appropriate because the party relying on the clause will typically 
be the party who has drafted the document, that approach is not so appropriate 
in the trust setting where the clause is the work of the testator.  Millett LJ held 
that since trustees accept office on the terms of a document for which they are 
not responsible they are entitled to have the protection of having the document 
fairly construed according the natural meaning of the words used and not 
restrictively.  
However, a paradox then arises (if the trust is also a contract with the 
beneficiary) meaning that upholding such a clause diminishes the rights of a 
beneficiary from suing trustees when they too have not had the chance to 
contribute to the terms when the trust deed was drafted. 
It is conceded that a unilateral declaration of trust defies common law 
bipartisan contractual analysis but can perhaps be rescued if scrutinised again 
through the special patrimony.  The special patrimony of a trust situation, with 
40 E Weinrib “The Fiduciary Obligation” (1975) 25 U Toronto LJ 10, at 120 
“[P]roperty is itself merely the label for that crystalised bundle of economic interests 
which the law deems worthy of protection…affixing the label of property constitutes 
a conclusion not a reason.  The difficulty is not to supply a label but to identify the 
protected interest.” 
41 H Stone “The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust” (1917) 17 Colum L 
Rev 467, at 477 “the real reason for the liability of the third party is the 
unconscientious interference with the right in personam which the [beneficiary] has 
against the trustee, and not any right in rem against the asset.” 
42 Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241 at 254 “It is, of course, far too late to suggest that 
the exclusion in a contract of liability for ordinary negligence or want of care is 
contrary to public policy.  What is true of a contract must be equally true of a 
settlement.” 
43 Bogg v Raper (1998/99) 1 International Trusts & Estates Law Reports 267. 
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seeming duality in ‘ownership’ means that as a body of rights and liabilities it 
is freestanding, disconnected from any person, forming neither the property of 
the trustee nor of beneficiary.  Instead of being crystallised around an 
individual or legal entity, in whose favour the court may decree performance, 
it owes its existence to the end to which it is devoted: its appropriation.  The 
instance of a unilateral declaration of trust is the settler transferring personal 
property to a special patrimony for an end to which the court is objectively 
able to determine.  In this way, a freestanding patrimonium not vested in 
anyone but with a particular appropriation, facilitates a working civil law 
understanding of charities and private purpose trusts of imperfect obligation, 
with no discernable beneficiary, without need for reference to a common law 




What is the purpose or value in analysing the English trust concept in such 
minutiae? The history of the trust idea has shown it is expansive; it has 
already spread throughout the common law world from the ‘use’ in the 
English Court of Chancery. There is clearly no singular governing trust 
concept that finds application across all jurisdictions, whether between 
common and civil law or inter-common law.  As capital markets pay less and 
less attention to geographical boundaries, trusts are being exported to 
jurisdictions (particularly civil ones) that have historically been unable to 
understand their conceptual underpinning. Thus is becomes vital to 
circumvent the trust as a ‘unique English institution’44 and any necessary 
connection with equity which has historically proved a barrier to its wider 
adoption and better understanding,45 Maitland may have been right; the trust 
is an extraordinary legal concept but long gone are the days of claims of its 
exclusive Englishness.  New ideas about how to conceptualise the trust are 
being reverberated back into the traditional common law understanding from 
inroads made into civil law jurisprudence.  The trust idea has broken moulds 
in its application; it is ironic that perhaps the English trust idea is itself a 
mould ready to be cracked open.  
44 Preamble to the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their 
Recognition (1985) “. . . the trust as developed in courts of equity in common law 
jurisdictions and adopted with some modifications in other jurisdictions, is a unique 
legal institution.” 
45 G L Gretton, above n 6, at 601 “The trust does not have to be conceptualised within 
the framework of English Law.  The trust presupposes neither equity nor divided 
ownership.” 
 
